Subscribe to Gozaar's feed in order to stay up to date on articles and statements that are posted on Gozaar. http://www.gozaar.org During both the Khomeini and Khamenei eras, the oppressive and totalitarian regime of the Islamic Republic has systematically undermined civil institutions, independent media, labor syndicates, nonconformist parties and, finally, student and university organizations. This is even truer of independent religious and clerical institutions in Iran. The inception of the religious government in Iran marked the demise of a thousand-year coexistence of the Shiite institutions with secular states in the country. It put an end to the dual roles of these institutions as the apologists of the ruling systems on the one hand, and the spokesperson for the people on the other. The name “Theatre Workshop,” which in the 1970s had an important role in shaping Iran’s modern and experimental theater, is inseparable from Arbi Ovanessian’s name. But since the revolution, Arbi has been living outside Iran and has kept the secrets of this valuable movement in Iran’s theatre by not having any conversation in Farsi about it. On November 1st, the controversial Canadian-Iranian weblogger Hossein Derakhshan was arrested in Tehran by agents of the judiciary. They were acting on orders of the notorious prosecutor-general Saeed Mortazavi, implicated in the torture and murder of Canadian-Iranian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi in July 2003. The arrest has created a predicament and challenge for the Canadian government as well as democratic forces in the Canadian-Iranian diaspora. Since President Ahmadinejad's reign in 2005, the self-styled "blogfather" who once championed the reformist cause in cyberspace had turned his talents to defamation of human rights advocates and anti-Western propaganda. It is now up to those he mercilessly defamed to ensure that he doesn't meet a tragic fate similar to Kazemi. The leaders of Iran’s totalitarian faction have often spoken of the collapse of the United States in a manner similar to how leaders of the Soviet Union once spoke. Their reasoning stems from their belief in the ‘rightfulness’ of the repressive government that rules Iran; Iranian clerics regard themselves as striving to uphold absolute good, and label their enemies as the manifestation of unadulterated evil. Applying the title ‘the Great Satan’ to the United States aims to accentuate this by contrasting a satanic America with the Iranian mullahs’ supposedly virtuous rule. Apart from their disregard for international law, engagement in a global arms race, imprisonment and assassination of opponents, and massacre of adversaries wherever they have seized power, Iran’s totalitarians have resorted to slogans and prayers[i] as their prime method for bringing about the collapse of the United States. The “merging of religion and democracy” is a meaningless construction. I also don’t understand the definition of a “religious democracy.” In Jewish societies such as Israel, or Christian societies such as those in Europe and the United States, democracies have emerged. In the U.S., society is, in some ways, more religious than its counterpart in Iran. This is partly because, contrary to Iran, religious freedom is actively practiced and officially recognized. Because of this, we can testify to the possibility of establishing a democracy in a religious society. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy of countering, arresting, and quelling its opponents remains in force as the end of the Ahmadinejad administration draws near. In this climate, students who had already paid dearly for their actions over the past three years took it upon themselves once more to act when no leader showed up to listen to them at this year’s “Student Day” function. They found a way to make their message of protest heard, and although it did not reach beyond the walls of the University of Tehran, it was nevertheless so piercing that it forced the leader of Iran into meaningful silence. In the last decade of Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule, the legal and social situation improved dramatically for Iranian women. They gained the right to choose, and be chosen. They gained the right to judge. Family law was amended, and family courts were established. As a result, men could no longer divorce their wives without having a court ruling in their favor. Women’s access to seek divorce increased. The child custody law was changed so the court maintained custody and would grant it to the parent deemed the most suitable. Before the monarchy was overthrown by the Islamic revolution, women had enjoyed the right to choose their own attire for over 40 years. Those who wanted to cover themselves could so choose, and those who did not, could wear whatever they pleased. Separation of the sexes was not practiced except in mosques and religious places. In professional environments, universities, recreational, and other places, the two sexes intermingled. So, the Islamic government’s forced veiling, and invasion of privacy of women after the revolution, was not acceptable under the legal provisions of the time. "To answer the question of whether or not human rights activists have been effective in the past few years, we must pose another question: if activists had not cried out in defense of the victims, made announcements, formed campaigns and protests, or opposed human rights violators, what would the state of human rights in Iran be like today? Without a doubt, these efforts have been useful and, of course, effective. At this time, the effectiveness of a human rights activist is measured by the role they play preventing the spread of human rights violations and thwarting the growth of the authoritarian base..." "The founding, establishment, and organization of particular social movements in Iran since 1993—including those of women, workers, students, and human rights activists—are among the results of civil society activists’ efforts toward promoting democracy in Iran. While this is not the place for analyzing these results or determining the breadth of their scope, a glimpse at the resources and potential of both the Iranian government and society reveals the high value of these results. In fact, this is all a part of the democratization of Iran, a process that—taking into account the meddling of Iranian affairs from the sidelines or abroad—seems to continue at a remarkable speed..." Iran is a revolutionary power, still in an exuberant phase of its revolution. Geopolitically it seeks to dominate the Gulf; ideologically it challenges the legitimacy of moderate governments in the region. Indeed, Iran aspires to be the leader of Islamist radicalism in the Muslim world as a whole. Iran’s conventional military buildup, its pursuit of nuclear weapons in defiance of the UN Security Council, and its interventions in Lebanon and Iraq not only reflect its ambitions but also explain its current self-confidence. "A group of faculty members presents this statement on the current condition of Iranian universities to academics and learned people in Iran. The statement lists concerns about the little amount of attention given to developing a structured infrastructure for scientific growth in Iran and about the lack of adhering to the law of the Fourth Development Plan, most notably the establishment of 'Development based upon Knowledge.'" "In assessing the influence and effectiveness of human rights activists within Iran, it is crucial to take into account the limitations and obstacles they face, while still expecting achievements that are proportional to their abilities and resources." "The civil society of Iran, which has always tried to overcome weakness and transition to a strong civil society, has, in the past few years, taken positive steps in this direction. However, with the rise of Ahmadinejad and his government—a government hostile toward civil society—to power, this trend has lost some of its momentum." In an effort to identify new ways to accelerate the process of democratization and recognition of human rights in Iran, Gozaar invites Iranian civil society activists and observers to participate in a short survey on democracy and human rights in Iran. Gozaar has already published the responses of select activists and will post other expert opinions on a continuing basis. If you would like to participate in the debate, please send your answers to info@gozaar.org. Majid Mohammadi shares his views on the upcoming Iranian presidential elections as part of Gozaar’s series of articles and interviews exploring the implications of the elections on U.S.-Iranian relations. In this piece, Mohammadi compares the factors that facilitated Iran’s influential presidential elections in the 1990s with those that have led to today’s seemingly inconsequential elections. In her report on Iranian women’s rights activist Mahboobeh Abbasgholizadeh’s recent speech at the University of Toronto, Laleh Bahar details Abbasgholizadeh’s views on the women’s movement in Iran. Bahar highlights the principles and activities of Abbasgholizadeh’s Women’s Field feminist movement and the activist’s analysis of the origins and current activities of her fellow reformers in today’s Iran. As the U.S. presidential elections quickly approach, commentators have taken note of the candidates’ foreign policy positions. A principal component of these platforms is the candidates’ respective stances on Iran and how the U.S. should proceed in its relations with the Islamic Republic. Here, Gozaar has published the relevant sections of the Republicans and Democrats’ platforms that relate to Iran. Journalist and U.S. foreign policy expert Robin Wright gives a voice to the silenced reformers in the Middle East in her new book Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East. Wright devotes two chapters to Iran, analyzing the country’s struggle for reform since the 1979 Revolution. Don’t miss Gozaar’s review of Wright’s new thought-provoking book. The sudden death of Iranian actor Khosro Shakibai prompted journalist and literary commentator Mohammad Sefriyan to analyze the films and unique point of view of filmmaker Dariush Mehrjui both before and after the Revolution. Sefryian discusses the correlation between the digression of Iranian intellectualism and the downward spiral of Iranian intellectual cinema.