Uphill Journey Toward Change

Public trust has plummeted in the wake of the tenth presidential election and people’s disillusionment has increased after a foiled peaceful transition to democracy for Iranian society. On the one hand, this spells a crisis of legitimacy for the Government, and on the other hand, it dashes hopes and deepens the despair of reformists.

If up until yesterday it was said the Government counted on mobilizing the masses in opposition to foreign crises and the reformists counted on election campaigns as the preferred method for bringing about political change, today neither side can so easily play the same cards. This is because the relationship between people, government, and reformists has changed in both form and substance, and rebuilding and renewing it requires a new strategy to regain trust.

The logical conclusion of the reform movement and the struggle of the people for finding a way out of the crisis is the subject of a conversation with Dr. Kazem Alamdar, university professor, political activist, and member of the central core of the Unity for a Democratic and Secular Republic in Iran (EJI).

The Reform Movement, dating from Khatami’s June 1997 win in the presidential election, started a fast-paced movement which ran into a dead-end in the middle of the Sixth Majles. As people’s hope turned to despair,  the social body of a movement that was to bring about the goals of reform crumbled, signaling the exit of reformists from power. Nevertheless, reform leaders tried in recent years to show that despite the difficulties, the only possible path forward was reform. By rebuilding their social forces they attempted to return to power by focusing their attention solely on the presidential elections, stressing that mass turnout of voters could change the situation in their favor. However, what was called an election coup d’état steered the Reform Movement  in a new direction. In your opinion, in light of the current situation, where do you see the Reform Movement heading?

The Reform Movement has acquired some special characteristics this time around. During the previous (ninth) round of elections, the government reformists continued to try, as they had done before, to win people's votes by asking voters to choose between “bad and worse.” However, the people were not so easily won over. As a result, a significant percentage of people abstained from voting altogether in that election. Others ended up voting for Ahmadinejad in the runoff either because they opposed Rafsanjani, or because they bought into Ahmadinejad’s slogans. However, the bitter experience of the Ahmadinejad Administration convinced all the reformists that the strategy adopted in the ninth elections should not be repeated.

Those defending reforms reached the conclusion that something needed to be done in order to prevent Ahmadinejad from being re-elected. So the reform candidates advertised the long list of people’s demands as their campaign agenda and assured the people that should they win, in contrast to the Khatami era, this time they would follow through with basic demands. These efforts went a long way towards restoring the bond between people and reformists and as a result, millions of hesitant voters became resolute in their decision to cast their vote in favor of the reformists. Had there been no rigging in the election or no coup d’état, we would be seeing today the birth of other civil and political movements solidifying the foundations for reform.

Given the above explanations, we see that although a new set of impediments stand in the way of reform, it is no longer possible to return to the previous path. On one hand, the people’s resistance continues in various forms, and on the other hand, discussions are taking place behind the scenes between the leaders of the two camps, the outcome of which remains to be seen. In any case, one can speculate two possible courses of development. Either the Khamenei faction will be forced to retreat and give in to at least part of the people’s demands, or they will have to make the police state complete and tighten their circle of exclusivity. The second option carries the risk of setting off the powder keg of people’s discontent.

Is there any way for the Reform Movement to push forward? If the answer is negative, what approach would you suggest?

As I said, in order for the Movement to move ahead, Khamenei’s faction must move away from complete strangulation and the dangers associated with it and allow society a little breathing room. In the case that the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad-Revolutionary Guard triumvirate, the force behind the rigging and coup d’état, does not back down, the scale of civil disobedience will only grow.

The world community too has been attentively following the developments in Iran. This time, people around the world, alongside their governments, are watching the people of Iran with an extremely sympathetic eye. One can only predict even further isolation for the Islamic Regime.

Can we expect only harsher and more violent clamping down, driving the movement underground, or will we move towards another revolution?

The mental and concrete elements required for carrying out a revolution are not in place. What has been transpiring in recent days as a matter of fact was not and is not a revolution. This has been a mass civil and social movement, not a revolution with certain demands concerning legal, civil, and political rights; nor has it been concerned with overthrowing the regime. Civil movements do not move forward by violent means because the people who participate in them are ordinary people from the streets and neighborhoods, not political professionals. This is the very positive aspect of the latest developments. This does not mean that scattered underground efforts and actions with a violent element are not taking place. However, these methods are not the final solution and will generally not be adopted.

How can the position of the reformists be stabilized? Do you think an anti-regime front will form or will they adopt a passive stance? Will they accept forced exile? Will they cooperate with the Government? Or are there other scenarios?

The future course adopted will not be one-sided. It will have at least three dimensions. One, the Regime’s policy in dealing with opponents; second, the people’s continued participation in a civil movement; and three, the role of reform leaders who will not abandon the people and who won’t shirk from bearing the consequences of continuing on the same path.

Thus far, looking at the bond between the reform candidates and the people supporting them and the popular resistance formed during the campaign period, one can say the status of the reformists as an opposition force is firmly in place. These two groups are attempting to prevent the present state of affairs which has somehow landed in their lap from slipping away. Those who hold the reins of power in the Regime too, if they are smart, will understand that a continuation of the coup d’état will mean only a dark future for the Regime.

What sort of social behaviors can we expect? How will the relationship between people and reformists, Government, clergy, and other forces of authority be redefined?

The continuation of the present methods is dependent on a variety of factors. The relationship between people and reformists depends on their continuing to resist. Up to this point, both Karroubi and Mousavi have been right alongside the people and the people for their part will remain beside them, although they are unable to display this relationship in public in mass demonstrations. The relationship of the people with the Government will tend more towards civil disobedience. This will not be another 1953 coup d’état in which the Regime will be able to expect the people to stand by in complete passivity. As you know, the clergy too is not completely homogenous. That portion of the clergy which has not participated in the crimes of the Regime will discover little-by-little that the Regime will continue to discredit and undermine the clerical establishment. You see how fresh the dangers of the 1953 coup d’état have remained in the collective memory of the people and how the memories are transferred from generation to generation.

This coup d’état as well can serve to cause the clergy to go down in history with a bad name associated with oppression, violence, and militarism. So they have been left with no other option than to make up for the harms they have inflicted on people.