The Reformists: Facing up to the Emergence of a Mass Movement

The reformist movement that emerged on May 23^rd, 1997 at the chronological mid point of the 6^th Majles, with Mohammad Khatami’s victory, began to decline when the people lost hope in the movement’s competence. However, its main artery was not completely severed such that its leaders retained some faith in its persistence and renewal. The tenth presidential elections presented another opportunity for the leaders of the Reformist movement to once again take the reigns of power, and with the implementation of necessary reforms, to guide the country on the path toward progress. They believed that widespread participation on the part of the people and the ultimate victory of the Reformist candidate would prepare the ground for a return to reforms. This conviction was so strong that they did not stop at anything to encourage people to participate in the elections. Indeed, they were so successful at this that for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic, 85% of the population turned out to vote. However, the way events developed, led some to interpret the election results as an election coup. These elections demonstrated that the unelected institutions in government have no desire to return to having reformists in power and will use any means to obstruct them. The question remains as to what the final outcome will be for reforms and Reformists.

Mohsen Nejad, a political activist and a member of the coalition of secular republicans responded to some questions in an interview.

Recent developments in the Iranian presidential elections have led to some major transformations in the Reformist program of regaining political power, such that they may not be able to speak of reforms for a long period of time. How do you assess this outcome for the Reformist movement?

We must search for the outcome of the Reformist movement in the steps of those young people who are today firmly standing in front of the regime, because the shaken Reformist movement is now following the vision of the people’s movement. They cannot act independently from the people and in the current situation more than their potential to regain leadership of the movement, they are followers of the people. They are shaken by the discovery that their strategy of pressure from below and negotiations from above could have been successful, but has failed. They did not have confidence in the people and because they were not reliant upon the people for their powers, they chose to beg for power within the framework of a bargaining process with the government. As such, some time will need to pass before they will be able to regroup and take on their new role as leaders of the Reform movement.

The strategy of pressure from below and negotiations from above was not one that could lead to victory. They should have followed a strategy of gaining power in cooperation with the people. At the same time, the pressure from below was more of a warning than a strategy which was never fully implemented. They were only warning the government that they were capable of pressuring them from below, while they should have been developing a trusting relationship with the people. Thus, by gaining the trust of the people, the reformists should have used this authority to gain power. And even when negotiations were at issue, the main goal was not to gain significant power but to decrease the government’s impositions on the Reformist movement. Thus both segments of this strategy were lacking in the attainment of necessary power.

If the reformist movement fails to conform to the movement that the people have started, it will be eliminated from the Iranian political scene.  At the same time, by regrouping their powers and bringing them in line with the people’s movement, they will be able to take advantage of this historical moment to obtain political power and end dictatorship. Without a doubt, this movement has transcended the Islamic regime and Velayat-e Faqih and if the reformist movement wants to come out victorious in this conflict, it must relate to and lead the people through revisions of its intellectual and organizational foundations. If the political elite of this movement keep following the people, they will surely fail.  In effect, the name and goal of the movement must change from “reforms” to “major changes.”

The changes in the Iranian political space and the mass movement that has emerged, has placed the Reformist movement in a position where it has no choice but to change its strategy. Amending the Constitution must be the main target of the Reformist movement. Adopting a strategy to amend the Constitution and eliminate any unelected positions, including Velayat-e Faqih, is the only way that the leaders of the reform movement can be transformed into the standard-bearers and leaders of the people’s green movement. Otherwise, they will forever be following the people and this would spell failure.

In the current situation and with attention to the history and experience of the reformists, which direction to you think they will pursue?

In determining the future of the Reformists in Iran, we must keep in mind that we are not talking about a unified group of politicians with a common and specific mindset and potential. The Reformist movement includes many factions with a variety of political and intellectual leanings and an array of capabilities and qualifications. Without a doubt, in an atmosphere of increased violence, many of these factions will turn to political passivity, and several others will focus on more academic activities and instead of political action, they will concentrate on extending their cultural activities. In effect, instead of stirring up the crowds, they will move in the direction of educating them, something that has historically occurred as mysticism.

What will happen to the reformist parties?

An increase in violence and oppression of the people can lead to the shutting down of political parties and the birth of Islamic fascism, but it will also render the government to a state of extreme fragility. This is because while it is possible to defeat this movement on the surface, this is not necessarily a total conquest. The rage and resentment of the people towards this regime will not be forgotten. People will return to their daily lives, but this movement will remain underground so that it can strike out and take revenge at the opportune moment. The day the government becomes convinced of its stability can be the same day as its collapse and the spark that ignites the dormant ashes. This will be similar to what happened after the founding of the “Rastakhiz Party.” Under such conditions, the Reformist movement can play a historical role, depending on whether it can come up with a strategy during the waiting period which can put it ahead of the people and in the position of leadership.

Will the movement lead to violent clashes, underground activities or revolutionary conflict?

I do not believe that at this juncture, the regime will be able to completely quell the people’s movement, but if we assume that the regime can be successful in this realm, the likelihood of the creation of guerilla, underground, and clandestine groups is highly probable. Thus we can say that the crisis of the regime will begin the day after the oppression of the people, because the regime has to be constantly vigilant of popular actions in order to halt any anti-regime activities. The regime cannot maintain this atmosphere for long and this will eventually lead to its downfall. According to one of the activists, the oppressors have weapons in their hands but our hands are free, so they will tire sooner. In reality, the situation will be such that the people can return to the streets any time they deem it necessary. In this situation, the regime is confronted with the harder task of anticipating uprisings, whereas the people are faced with fewer obstacles and cannot be easily suppressed. It is the regime that is currently under siege.

The people’s movement has placed Iran under revolutionary conditions and these conditions are not irreversible. Thus, at this moment, the regime has met with a great challenge which it cannot ignore. Now, the regime and the person of Mr. Khamenei are faced with a choice. They can choose conflict with the people, as the Shah did, and sit in anticipation of their revolt. Or they can choose the second path of gradually handing power over to the people and saving themselves from a dark and bitter destiny. Experience has shown that Khamenei, like many other dictators, will choose the first path. But what is more important is that the Reformist leaders choose the right path, so that when the time is right, they can take over executive powers and realize Iran’s transition to democracy. During this waiting period, the focus should be on amending the Constitution. The establishment of a secular republic, in which all ideas and opinions, including religious ones, can develop, is the forward looking option. Even for the religious groups and any other ideologies, a secular republican government is the best form of government for their defense and survival