Sazegara: Now Is the Time for Civil Disobedience and Widespread Strikes

One year after the electoral coup in Iran, domestic and international observers have clearly recognized Musavi, Karrubi, Khatami, and Mrs. Zahra Rahnavard as the leaders of the Green Movement. Nevertheless, these individuals have frequently stressed that they do not view themselves as the Movement’s leaders, and many incidents have occurred without their endorsement.

We asked Mohsen Sazegara about the role of these leaders within the Green Movement, their competence and incompetence, and the necessity of change in the Movement’s leadership. Sazegara, whom some regard as a mainstay in the Green Movement, has been one of the most staunch defenders of the Movement. He has posted his daily videos on YouTube to promote the Green Movement and provide the protesters with tactical information to surge ahead in their struggle. He endorses the strategies that the Movement’s leaders have adopted and praises their work.

The Movement has now entered a phase in which civil disobedience, boycotts, and strikes must turn into its main guidelines for action. The leadership needs executive committees to transmit these guidelines to the Movement’s body in a more coherent and focused way. Although members of these committees should naturally remain hidden, they must act publicly.

How do you evaluate the role of Musavi, Karrubi, Khatami, and Mrs. Rahnavard as the leaders of the Green Movement during the past year?

To respond to this question, we must first determine what the leadership of a social-political movement means and what our expectations are. The movement’s leadership must perform four duties: elucidation of long-term goals and objectives; adoption of a specific strategy; adoption of operational methods and proper tactics; the ability to organize forces and offer appropriate solutions to pull through crises. Based on these paradigms, we can examine the impact of these leaders on the Green Movement.

Is the performance of the Green Movement’s leaders in delineating their aims and objectives defensible?

If we use the statements of Musavi and Karrubi as the basis of our assessment, the most immediate objective that these leaders pursue is “to take back the people’s votes.” This means that the Movement’s leaders do not recognize Ahmadinejad as the President. In the beginning, people and the Movement’s body supported this demand, but little by little people went one step further and deposed Khamenei and chanted slogans of referendum on the streets. After these events, Mr. Musavi intelligently announced that the Movement’s next objective is “free elections.” In fact, the mentioning of this objective pointed to the movement’s ultimate goal: free elections without interference by the Guardian Council and with an electoral supervisory board. This demand, which will lead to the overthrow of Ahmadinejad’s coup government, is the Movement’s most immediate objective and can satisfy even those who no longer want this system. Therefore, we must admit that the Movement’s leaders have succeeded in setting clear guidelines about the Movement’s goals and objectives.

Have they also succeeded in choosing an efficient strategy for the Movement?

The main question is how the Movement can realize its objectives. In answering this question, the leaders of the Green Movement have repeatedly insisted on civil and peaceful resistance, which relies on the principles of nonviolent struggle. Embracing this strategy, the Movement’s leaders have separated their path from the organizations that believe in armed and violent struggle. This is the best strategy for struggle, the most powerful method of combat with tyrants, and the safest way for transition to democracy. There are no guarantees in violent struggles because a group that seizes power by force may easily ignore democracy and its principles. But since the participation of large segments of society is an essential element of civil and nonviolent protests in the struggle against dictatorial governance, the likelihood of establishing democracy after a victory is much higher.

If the leadership had pursued the formation of a classical organization, the regime would have crushed it easily by arresting all its members.

What do you think of the tactics that the Movement’s leaders have adopted?

The leaders of the Green Movement have offered a new approach: planning activities from the bottom up. Instead of imposing inflexible and rigid tactics on their supporters, the leaders have provided the Movement’s body with an opportunity to plan and carry out their activities by exercising their creativity and initiative. The important point is that the Movement has now entered a phase that requires more complex practical tactics to widen the gaps within the regime in order to paralyze it. The correct application of the tactics in this stage will result in the victory of nonviolent struggle. In this phase, the leadership can no longer pursue the bottom to top approach. Complex activities require focused planning and mobilization. The Movement’s victory in this stage depends on the intelligent guidance of leaders who must change their tactics quickly in response to the behavior of their adversaries.

Can you explain more what you mean by “complex activities and planning?”

One of the most important tactics is the refusal to cooperate. Of course, the Movement in this stage faces a number of challenges. In this phase, the Movement needs executive committees to mobilize and coordinate its forces because its leaders inside Iran are under extreme pressure and we cannot expect them to announce practical plans with specific step by step details. The Movement’s activists should fill this vacuum by helping the leadership.

You also mentioned that pulling through crises was another important duty of the Movement’s leaders. How do you evaluate their actions?
 
As the Movement strikes a few blows at its adversary, it also receives a few blows. Therefore, the Movement cannot advance with pre-arranged formulations. The leaders should adopt suitable tactics to drive the Movement ahead, especially because the Green Movement is facing a regime that has learned well methods of repression from dictatorial regimes in China and Russia. To ensure the Movement’s victory, the leadership must organize its forces efficiently. Musavi has carried out this task admirably by relying on existing social networks, such as guild organizations, student, women’s and teachers’ movements, and even family networks. Of course, when the regime noticed the efficiency of these networks, it intensified its attacks. Another issue is the problem of communication and the dissemination of information. In the past year, the Movement has utilized the internet and satellite television networks that have been attacked and restricted by the regime. To explain the other challenge, permit me first to mention the three principles of nonviolent struggle: solidarity, planning, and maintaining the discipline of nonviolent struggle. If any of these three elements falters, the Movement will not triumph. The regime also endeavors to provoke conflicts within the Movement’s ranks. Iranian society is a plural society and as long as this plurality is not recognized, no unity can be achieved. Musavi has correctly recognized this plurality and has stressed its significance in his statements. During the last year, the regime tried to scatter the Movement’s activists by fostering divisions among them, but this stratagem was not successful.

If we accept the leadership’s success in specifying the Movement’s objective and adopting a deft strategy, there are certainly some shortcomings in the choice of tactics. The bottom up tactic may be productive at times, but its indiscriminate repetition can have dire consequences. As we have seen, this tactic led to violence on Ashura and failed completely on February 11, 2010 (22nd of Bahman). In fact, the vacuum of leadership was evident on these two occasions and it clearly hurt the Movement.

This requires a detailed discussion. In regard to Ashura, it was obvious that the Islamic Republic would resort to violence, but the leaders of the Movement took advantage of this episode to strip the regime of its legitimacy (Ashura is a Shiite holy day and this is a regime that governs in the name of the Shiite religion). On this day, the regime received a massive blow. But the situation on February 11 was different and demands a more accurate evaluation. February 11 was a disastrous example of the bottom up model because everyone was prescribing a different approach; most activists who were silent until that day began to propose their own plans of action. Although this model had produced excellent results, especially on the 40th day memorial of Movement’s martyrs, there was a serious lack of coordination among the forces on this day. The Movement’s main approach in the past year was to sketch the general drift of its plans and activities and then, in praxis and amidst the actual situation, exercise its initiatives to succeed. But the absence of coordination among the forces and the ineffectiveness of the bottom to top model became evident on February 11.

When the leadership does not take part in selecting the tactics, it can hardly play a significant role at the time of action in order to tip the balance in favor of the Movement. This was the vacuum that all the activists within the Movement noticed and tried to amend. This was at the root of what you call the absence of coordination among the forces.

In my view, while the leadership has expressed its views on all plans of action, it has also humbly allowed the Movement’s body to exercise its initiatives. February 11 blundered because we suddenly came face to face with a new phenomenon: everyone wanted to be a leader. Of course, we should not overlook the adversary’s all-out preparation.

Another criticism that is leveled against the leadership is its little efforts to organize the forces. While Musavi’s advisers and helpers have been arrested, the leadership has been unable to replace them with new forces or organize the forces within the Movement.

If the leadership had pursued the formation of a classical organization, the regime would have crushed it easily by arresting all its members.

When we speak of organizing the forces, the point is to utilize the existing capacities to advance the Movement’s objectives. The Iranians who live outside the country are one of the Movement’s existing capacities. Do you think a more effective use of this force could have doubled the Green Movement’s capacity?

The Movement’s leaders took advantage of internet and social networks to organize the Iranians outside the country. They knew that the existing plurality among Iranian expatriates made their gathering under a single banner impossible. Perhaps the formation of something like the African National Congress could be useful. The African National Congress was formed with the participation of all activists in South Africa to overthrow the apartheid regime. This is a model that can be borrowed by the Green Movement. All forces could then act in unison and under a single slogan.

Do you think the leadership has succeeded in exploiting the capacity of the Movement’s body adequately?

My answer is both yes and no. “No” because there is a lot of potential in the Movement’s body, which is the product of three decades of incompetence by a regime that has mismanaged everything. We should not forget either the civil and political struggles that have been accumulated for a few decades. Perhaps, not even less than half of this potential is released so far.

“Yes” because, under pressure from the regime’s savagery, numerous difficulties, and the obstacles to practical possibilities, the potential of social forces could not be actualized more than its present level.

What change is required in the Movement’s leadership to prepare it for victory?

The Movement has now entered a phase in which civil disobedience, boycotts, and strikes must turn into its main guidelines for action. The leadership needs executive committees to transmit these guidelines to the Movement’s body in a more coherent and focused way. Although members of these committees should naturally remain hidden, they must act publicly.