An Eye for the Citizens

Mehrdad Mashayekhi Emphasizes the Need to Focus on the Interests of Iran's People

Mehrdad Mashayekhi and Fariba Davudi Mohajer discuss the differences between national interests and personal interests and how the two can be brought together to benefit the citizens of Iran. Mehrdad Mashayekhi has a Ph.D. in sociology and an M.A. in economics from American University. He is the author of dozens of articles and interviews on post-revolutionary political and sociological developments and has been published in both English and Farsi publications including: Iranians, Open Democracy, Shahrvand Publications, and Gozaar.

Merhdad Mashayekhi: I have to admit that the debate over national interests, which has recently gained impetus among Iranians in the early years of the 21st century, is of considerable interest indeed, especially when the earliest of such debates among Europeans is known to have taken place in the 19th century and afterwards.

It is important to point to the stunted development of the twin pillars of “nation-state” as the main root of Iranian neglect of the concept of national interests. In other words, no modern nation-state, in the real sense of the word, has formed yet. The gap between the Iranian “nation”—whose constituent parts continue to remain undefined—and the “state” in Iran which has ruled over the nation in spite of limited relations with it, has, in the end, resulted in the distortion of the meaning of "national interests."

Both the Pahlavi Monarchy [1941-79] and the Islamic Republic [1979-2008] have, in their own way and from their own standpoint, determined what sort of notions constitute "national interests." For example, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi regarded the formation of the Rastakhiz Party [1975], interference in the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman [1962-75] and curbing of rights of Iranian ethnic minorities as genuine national interests. Similarly, Ruhollah Khomeini also defined the prolongation of the Iran-Iraq War [1980-88] in the same fashion. Now Khamenei, and Ahmadinejad too, have deemed souring relations with the Western world a critical need, particularly the crisis centered around the nuclear issue, to be an integral part of national interests.

Although, in the end, it is the politicians and political intellectuals who define national interests and deliver their definition to society, it should also be noted that in democratic societies, "nation" is defined as a plural, heterogeneous amalgam enjoying civil rights. That is to say, the law is in a relative fashion the defender of these rights.

FDM: Is law the only guarantee for these rights and are there any other parameters involved?

MM: Certainly one cannot overlook the role education and free, or relatively free, mass media play in shaping the public opinion. Politicians in democratic societies, when formulating something called "national interests" are hardly unconcerned about public opinion and the question of their own re-election. If they take the wrong route, they will have to pay the cost in the next elections.

But in Iran, neither does "national interests" have a clear meaning nor is the scope of government jurisdiction clearly demarcated. Failure to take advantage of scientific opinion polls, and even worse than that, not making public the results of the polls, have excluded various strata of the Iranian nation from playing their crucial role in defining and revising national interests of Iran. On this basis, we have so far been dealing with "governmental interests," not national interests.

FDM: You have spoken of civil rights and national interests. Can you elaborate on the logical relation between these two concepts?

MM: As I discussed above, consolidation of the "nation" in its real sense, and establishment of a balanced and stable relationship with the state entails realization of citizenship rights. Citizenship means the individual's modern relationship with the nation-state. This relationship is defined in three dimensions:

1. Membership in a national unit.
   
2. Entitlement to a body of rights.
   
3. Elimination of structural hurdles to realize citizenship rights in practice.

The concept of citizenship, and the rights that are dependent on it, has been consolidated since the 18th century in parallel with the expansion of democracy, and stage-by-stage, its substance has been filled out.

In Thomas Marshall's words, citizenship rights have gradually grown out of the civil sphere into the political sphere and eventually into the sphere of economic and social rights and still continues to develop and take root in democratic countries.

FDM: But where is the relation between national interests and individual interests and where can one find common ground between these two?

MM: Well, when citizenship rights are satisfied on a practical level, such rights as freedom of speech, freedom to gather and form unions and guilds, freedom of religion, cultural, linguistic and similar rights, the groups formed out of this nation are enabled to deal with the issue based on their own group interests. For example, "is war to our benefit" and "does insistence on enrichment of uranium incorporate the interests of the entire nation or the majority of the formed groups?" It is only then that decision-makers, in the capacity of rulers and the politically elect, can voice the real—not assumed—demands and interests of the majority of the nation.

In today's Iran, and in the absence of citizenship rights, momentous decisions made by Ahmadinejad administration are not at all indicative of the interests of women, youths, students, workers, cultural leaders, teachers, religious-ethnic minorities, secularists, intellectuals, dissidents, and other sections of the Iranian nation.

FDM: Political groups invariably hijack the notion of "national interests" and redefine it in relation to "national security." What relation do you see between the two?

MM: If national interests are defined democratically, that is, if they incorporate the varied aspirations, opinions, interests and inclinations that make up the nation, in that case the nation-state's power of resistance against dangers that can potentially threaten "national security" increases.

If we define "national security" as a condition in which factors that bring about change are controlled by the nation-state so that destabilizing and undesirable events, despite resistance, do not happen, then majority participation of people in determining their own fate will lead them toward solidarity and a shared fate.

In that case, regardless of whether factors inducing "insecurity" have internal or external grounds, the possibility to resist and repel such dangers is increased. The best example of this is the possibility of military intervention from outside the country's boundaries. A nation that truly considers itself as its own "master," and does not have an intense sense of self-alienation toward the ruling power, and is, at the same time, capable of exerting influence on policy-making through public opinion, will understandably be ready in every way to resist and defend its homeland in the face of any threat.

It stands to reason that the power of national defense against threats starts to dwindle away proportionally to the degree to which eliminatory and discriminatory policies of the ruling power alienate various sectors of the nation.

FDM: You mentioned citizenship rights. I would like to know how social movements are related to citizenship rights.

MM: If we observe how, in the past few decades, the process of social segregation becomes increasingly subject to reinforcement and intensification, the country's social groups begin to take advantage of a collective self-consciousness and voice their specific demands. The most important demands among these have been related to women, students, youths, teachers, workers, intellectuals, ethnic minorities, secularists, the external political community, and even parts of the clergy eliminated from the regime. In this process of self-consciousness, three features are of great import:

1. The state's domination of various aspects of social existence, due to which, any opposition and conflict in Iranian society instantly finds itself at odds with the state. In other words, the Islamic Republic regime is, itself, the most important factor for politicization of social groups and their demands. It is for this reason that the nature of any campaign in which civil society forces are involved is political.
   
2. The discriminatory nature of the ruling regime. This regime is, first and foremost, an agent of discrimination in addition to being an agent of exploitation and oppression. That is because its ideology is totalitarian and religious and has an elemental inclination toward eliminating vast sectors of the Iranian nation. Any sector of the Iranian society that does not comply with the limited interpretation and definition by the ruling power of Velayat-e faqih's[1] version of Islam is liable to be eliminated and deprived of its lawful rights of citizenship. By virtue of this, the regime indirectly contributes to the process of collective consciousness and even to the extent of involving eliminated groups in struggles to recover their lost rights. The best and most obvious example of this can be found in the history of women’s attempts to assert themselves in their struggle.
   
3. Influence of globalization on social movements in Iran. A variety of social groups learn from struggles and experiences of their counterparts in other countries around the world. Therefore, in today's Iran, at least in the country's bigger cities, the struggle for citizenship rights enjoys a broad and powerful domain.

FDM: You frequently use the words "struggle" and "attempt" in conjunction with citizenship rights in your responses. What is the essence of these struggles and attempts?

MM: These attempts have two salient features. First, they partake of a "movement," and second, they are "civil."

You know that the Islamic Republic has blocked legal and institutionalized facilities. However, struggles and movements do not require a legal license to act and carry out their campaign. “The Campaign for One Million Signatures for Change,” for example, does not need to be recognized by the government and will act of its own accord as it sees fit. However, the substance of these demands, both because these sub-movements are young, and because the government is strict, are for the most part at the level of civil demands. Therefore, as soon as the smallest window of political opportunity opens up for social groups to voice their demands, we encounter rapid expansion of various movements and sub-movements which begin to operate on the basis of their own citizenship rights. Signs of its approach can already be spotted on the horizon even as we speak. Since the demands of the majority of these movements are of the civil and citizenship type, they are basically all in tune with each other and moving in the same direction. The question of how much these (sub-)movements are aware of this fact or how much strategic importance they give to this bond should be answered in more favorable political conditions.

In any case, in the end it is this bond between these special movements which can and should prepare the grounds for the all-embracing, anti-discrimination movement for citizenship rights. Although these demands are not directly political and are not aiming at transforming the political system, the Islamic Republic regime, as the impression it has projected so far shows, can hardly make concessions to the root demands of these movements.

The problem with the Islamic Republic is not merely that of a conventional totalitarian regime. Such regimes can retreat in stages and compromise with moderate advocates of democracy. The Islamic Republic, however, has this other problem that it has defined and propagated itself in such an idealistic and ideological way that once it adopts a new approach and accepts democracy and human rights and secularism, it will be accused of betrayal and acting against its own principles in the eyes of its supporters and hard-line fanatics. In any case, these movements should establish links at more advanced and favorable stages between their civil demands and political demands and mechanisms in order to increase their chances for success.

FDM: As a last question, what, in your opinion, are the factors that may serve to enhance the link between social movements and citizenship rights?

MM: The first point in this area is theoretical-political awareness about this issue. Adequate discussion must take place at an extensive level on the necessity of solidarity and compatibility between common demands of the social movements. Understandably, there are people inside each movement who, for various reasons, have stronger bonds with people in other movements. For example, there are female teachers who can play an instrumental role both in women’s movements and in movements related to teachers and/or writers and intellectuals who in turn, are involved both in intellectual movements and also in, say, environmental movements.

It goes without saying that sub-movements today are in need of a broader vista and a more comprehensive set of demands than that which would merely meet their immediate needs. This requires more rigorous organization and the development of the widest networks of contact as possible.

In the end, without formation of this all—embracing movement, or without "rainbow" movements based on citizenship rights, and also without the support of democratic political groups and forces in the country, these movements do not stand a good chance of success.

FDM: Thank you for accepting to do this interview with us.