The Shifting Composition of Political Forces in Iran

As Ahmadinejad’s military-security government and Khamenei’s unswerving totalitarian rule have dominated the current political atmosphere in Iran, a new arrangement of political forces has also emerged which is fundamentally different from previous political arrangements throughout the Islamic Republic. Before examining this new arrangement, we should look at important structural changes that have occurred after the failures of the reformist movement and Khatami’s submission to the demands of the regime’s conservative faction. From 2001 to 2007, four major changes have affected Iran and its political society:

First, after the elections of the seventh Parliament and the ninth government, the ruling technocrats, who rose to power during the presidencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami, were gradually replaced by people who had served faithfully in military and security institutions and who had no qualms about violating civil and human rights of citizens. In previous years, traditionalist officials within the government and non-elected institutions shared government subsidies and privileges with other members of the executive branch and Parliament who held different views. After Ahmadinejad’s victory, these subsidies and privileges have been channeled exclusively to those faithful to Khamenei in all governmental institutions. To benefit from these privileges, factions within the Islamic regime, whether totalitarian or reformist, have always declared their faith in ideological Islam and a constitution which emphasizes the Velayat-e Faqih as its most fundamental principle. Thus, the presence of more moderate forces would have been tolerated within executive and legislative branches only if they embraced these beliefs. The various factions within the ruling body, however, differ over the extent of the Velayat-e Faqih’s powers. Nonetheless, Khamenei, by eliminating his reformist rivals, has managed to appoint the forces loyal to him in various governmental institutions in a way that is similar to the monopoly of power by Khomeini during the first decade of the Revolution.

Because of their military and security experience, these elements are most comfortable with and thrive by generating crises and unstable political conditions. That is why they have focused on concocting confrontations and deadlock in both the Middle East and on the international scene. Political tensions with Western countries over the Ahmadinejad government’s resumption of enrichment of uranium and its denial of the Holocaust have brought Iran to the verge of a military confrontation. The high number of international resolutions against Iran adopted in such a short time is unprecedented in Iranian history.

Second, a new wave of emigration to Western countries has begun as the result of the Islamic Republic’s undiminished pressures on intellectuals, writers, artists, and journalists who have now assumed a crucial role in producing cultural dissent through their activities in Farsi-language media outside Iran. This new generation has reached new horizons in its ideological diversity and its expansive intellectual discourse. The new emigrants include religious, Marxists, and secular intellectuals; radio, television and Internet-based journalists; artists, academic researchers, policymakers and activists, representing a spectrum of political perspectives. Although the Iranian regime has tried to filter Internet content and block the reception of radio and television satellite programs, which reflect the views of these dissenting emigrants, the voice of this generation still reaches the intellectuals, journalists, and political activists inside Iran. Hundreds of radio and television programs and Internet sites, whose materials are produced outside Iran, expose Iranians to a varied range of programs over which the Islamic Republic has no control. The regime’s attempt to filter Internet sites and interfere with satellite programs has miserably failed since it has been unable to totally cut off the connection of the Iranians inside the country with the expatriates who promote democracy and civil rights.

As a means of depriving individuals from dissenting groups of political participation, the Islamic Republic has instituted repressive policies which have led to their expatriation. Yet, the government has failed to prevent these expatriates from producing intellectual and cultural material. In fact, Iranian expatriates have succeeded to indirectly affect the political movements inside Iran, particularly the student and women’s movements, through their contributions. The outlooks of these groups are compatible with democratic or liberal-democratic discourse and they are paving the way for the acceptance of these views by a vast public inside Iran. However, this intellectual debate is not limited to these groups.

Third, broad disillusionment with reforms pushed the religious intellectuals to the margins of political society. The religious intellectuals, who had enjoyed extraordinary popularity during Khatami’s first term, tried to present religious democracy as the ideological basis of the reform movement, but they ran aground in their endeavor to achieve democracy within an Islamic framework that gave clergy the right to interpret the tenets of Islam. They also advocated for a necessary minimum level Islamic belief in the public sphere which legitimized their own grip on power. While this group essentially functioned within the framework of Islamic ideology, its interpretation of Islam was not taken seriously by Iranian youths who longed for unconditional democracy and freedom and sought diverse lifestyle models within the public arena.

This political turn-around forced the religious intellectuals to move away from the “Islam of spirituality” and toward an “Islam of identity” in order to maintain their relationship with various segments of society. The Islam of spirituality tended to define religion as a private affair that was essentially depoliticized. At the same time, although most religious intellectuals had denied the primacy of the Velayat-e Faqih, they could not leave behind the basic teachings of an ideological Islam. This, therefore, forced them to preserve the following principles or notions: a strong religious presence in social arenas; religious institutions functioning as pressure groups within political society; the role of religion as the most important basis of morality in society; the importance of religious teachings; a strong leadership role for the clergy; a government driven by ideology; and a clear hierarchy between religious and secular individuals, as well as men and women, in the distribution of political, civil and social rights. The Islam of identity was nothing less than the complete restoration of this value-system.

Fourth, the ninth government came to power on the promise of “bringing oil revenues to kitchen tables,” but the plunder of national resources by military-security officials obedient to Khamenei only increased unemployment and poverty and widened the gap between rich and poor. The ninth government’s promise to combat financial corruption was an effective message in its campaign, but after the election, Ahmadinejad merely replaced the technocrats who were abusing the country’s financial resources with his own supporters. The increase of the budget deficit, the pillaging of monetary reserves, and the reckless injection of oil revenues into the economy have destabilized Iran’s economic infrastructure and weakened Iran’s financial and monetary institutions. The government has forgiven its own heavy debt to the banks and interfered with transactions of both public and private banks. Since 2006, the amount of currency in circulation in Iran has doubled, forcing prices to skyrocket. These policies have failed to create stable employment or reduce inflation. Instead, they have created a system which favors wealthy individuals with access to government officials.

The ninth government rode the people’s discontent with social injustice to election victory. This illusion quickly disappeared as existing injustice spread to all aspects of society. Now injustice and inequality exists in every crevice of Iran’s social and economic spheres, touching everything from employment opportunity to court verdicts to social mobility to gender equality. While 49 percent of the national revenue is amassed by 2 percent of the population, almost 20 percent of the Iranian population lives below the poverty line and almost one million families cannot purchase even basic necessities. The government came to power clinging to the slogan of social justice, yet has only aggravated the already bleak economic conditions. While the ninth government has accused its enemies of an orchestrated conspiracy, unbridled inflation and unemployment have disillusioned people with the populist promises of the regime. Indeed, it did not take much time for people to become disenchanted with the military and security officials that now control the government and justify their illegal use of violence as an unavoidable means to social justice.

The marginalization of religious intellectuals and reformists and the rise of a totalitarian government was the result of Khatami’s failure to respond to the demands of the Iranian people. But the conservative traditionalists, who had been forced to turn key positions within government over to former security bosses and Revolutionary Guard officials, soon understood the danger of allowing power to rest in the hands of such inexperienced and incompetent people. The traditionalists began to distance themselves from these military and security officials after the humiliating defeat of this group in the third City Council elections, where public opinion began to turn against them and their empty populist slogans.  

The repression of democratic forces and the silence of reformists made the more pragmatic groups, such as Kargozaran-e Sazandegi (“Executives of Rebuilding” which support Hashemi Rafsanjani) and Majma-e Ruhaniun-e Mobarez (the Society of Combatant Clerics) rethink their strategy. They began to distance themselves from democracy-seeking and liberal-democratic forces and enter into a coalition which includes Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, former military general and current mayor of Tehran. But liberal-democratic forces, such as Tahkim-e Vahdat (the Office for the Consolidation of Unity), are as far from Qalibaf’s group as they are from the members of Kargozaran-e Sazandegi in Tehran’s third City Councils.

The influence of military bosses, who adhere to a totalitarian ideology, has grown significantly in this period as they have taken over the legislative and executive branches of government and enjoyed Khamenei’s unflagging support. Most members of the cabinet and seventh Parliament, as well as provincial governors, come from the Revolutionary Guard Corps and security forces. This faction has competed for the seats in the third City Councils and the Assembly of Experts without aligning itself with other political groups, reflecting its confidence in its own power. Also, since the number of the members of the Council of Expediency will increase from 39 to 44, this faction hopes to gain additional seats in this body. This military-security group, which was previously considered an offshoot of the traditionalist faction and carried out its activities in the margins of Iran’s political sphere, has now assumed a central role in Iranian politics. In contrast, the influence of totalitarian traditionalists and totalitarian pragmatists has declined significantly. The traditionalists, who had resorted to military and security bosses to boot out the reformists from the executive branch, suddenly found themselves relegated to the peripheries of Iranian politics after the presidential elections in 2005. After these elections, the totalitarian pragmatists, who had helped the traditionalists to suppress the reform movement, also lost their hold on key positions within the government.

In exploiting the uranium enrichment issue, resulting in economic sanctions, threats and, possibly a military attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad’s government sought to prolong the presence of military and intelligence forces in government and other pivotal institutions by creating a military atmosphere in society. This government lacks any real legitimacy among Iranian people – except in the case of a military attack by the United States or its allies. The suppression of political and social rights of Iranians in the name of advancing uranium enrichment programs has led to the further isolation of Iran on the international scene and a widespread violation of fundamental civil and human rights of Iranians.

Unlike the traditionalists and pragmatists, the military-security faction rejects any form of political party. It views society as a unified mass which political parties will only divide and split up. Also, this faction is prevented from becoming a political party by two major obstacles. The first obstacle is of a legal nature; the Constitution clearly states that the military may not form a political party. The second obstacle reflects the hostility of traditionalists and pragmatists to a party with military ties. These groups have disapproved of the military-security officials’ unscrupulous use of military organizations and facilities to achieve their political objectives. Also, while they shamelessly exploit the slogan of social justice, these officials seek to distance themselves from existing political parties in order to take advantage of the wave of public dissatisfaction with these parties.

From its own perspective, this military group derives its legitimacy not from the Velayat-e Faqih or other Shi’a authorities but from its direct ties with Imam Zaman himself (the 12th Imam who, like the Messiah, will reappear at the time of apocalypse). Examples include Ahmadinejad’s claim that he was enveloped in a halo of light in the United Nations’ courtyard and Ayatollah Meshkini’s claim that all members of the seventh Parliament have been approved by the Imam Zaman. This group has abandoned revolutionary views and reliance on Islamic jurists and instead embraced a kind of apocalyptic and utopian vision. 

The most important development in the religious democracy movement is the shift of some of its members toward an Islam of identity. The embrace of ideological Islam by these former reformists is a maneuver to preserve their political legitimacy in the eyes of the ruling caste and to ensure the continuation of their interests and privileges in a restricted political society. The discourse of ideological Islam and the Islam of identity has penetrated this group to such a degree that cooperation with secular forces is unlikely.

Two groups of non-aligned democrats and liberal-democrats still support minimal interference of Islam in the public sphere and, as a result, they have been completely barred from the ruling group. Tahkim-e Vahdat was not permitted to hold their usual annual elections at universities. The Association of Iranian Writers has also been prevented from meeting publicly. These pressures have impelled Tahkim-e Vahdat to overcome its factional differences and act as a more united front. (1) In the post-Khatami era, these groups have not even been able to dialogue with the ruling regime since Khamenei’s homogenous regime considers them as its sworn enemies. Some segments of Khatami’s government, at least in its lower ranks, were still willing to listen to the concerns of these groups.

The main principles of Iran’s political factions are revealed above. Traditionalists support the clergy and equate religious government with the absolute rule of clerics. Pragmatists privilege the state as a tool for change because, from their perspective, only the state can initiate progress and development. Military and security bosses seek a ruthlessly single-minded leadership. Religious democrats are religious more than they are democratic and, whenever these two values are in conflict, they choose religion over democracy. Non-aligned democrats and liberal-democrats are the only forces that advocate a secular state by placing religion outside of the political sphere. These groups adhere to non-violent methods for changing the ruling system. Other groups are more concerned with political participation within the current political framework and thus endeavor to prolong the status quo.

Under the ninth government, Iranian society has not yet witnessed a cataclysmic transformation or confrontation within society. Of course, in some cases, a number of political personalities have adjusted their agendas to the evolving demands of different social groups. The urban and rural lower classes, which had lost all hope for the improvement of their conditions during Rafsanjani’s and Khatami’s governments, have put their faith in Ahamdinejad’s military-security government. However, they were ultimately disappointed as this government set in motion one political and economic catastrophe after another. Now, Iranian pragmatists and religious democrats have another chance to gain the support of the Iranian people.

(1) http://www.roozonline.com/archives/2007/03/003080.php