Home | Articles | Musavi, Awakened but Still in Denial

Musavi, Awakened but Still in Denial

موسوی خط امام، موسوی جنبش سبز

21 June 2010 Majid Mohammadi
Font size: Decrease font Enlarge font
Musavi, Awakened but Still in Denial

 

 

One who is not aware of the Iranian history in the last three decades, and reads Mirhossein Musavi's statements, will see only Musavi and Ahmadinejad confronting each other while the leader takes side with the latter. In his eighteen statements issued so far, Musavi has presumed that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's way of ruling and the marching of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps commanders to power began in 2009. For him, the starting point for social movements during the Islamic Republic is the Green Movement. He not only lacks any critical approach to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s era, but also keeps his silence about the Rafsanjani and Khatami policies during their sixteen years of administration.

 

Twenty Years of Political Hibernation

The huge fraud in the tenth presidential election and its consequential suffering for Musavi such as his nephew's assassination and imprisonment of his family members, close friends, and advisors, awakened him after twenty years of political hibernation. Even if we put Khomeini's era in parentheses, the killing of dissidents inside the country and abroad, torture, banning the independent press, and institutionalized violations of human rights did not begin in 2009. Nevertheless, due to his decency, truthfulness, and cultural life, he has had a long journey in just one year. He has made up for his long silence with explicit opposition to hypocrisy, lies, fraud, ignorance, superstition, corruption, terror, and torture in the last 12 months. When he says, "now is the anniversary of the unique Green Movement and during this time period its activists have had a long journey in the path of hope" (Musavi statement no. 18) he is describing himself.

 

Iranian individuals, who suffered in the last two or three decades, do welcome the awakening of religious reformists, and appreciate the extension of the opposition movement. Nevertheless, they expect the regime's defectors not to merely focus on recent events and to look for the roots and foundations of oppressions and crackdowns in the Islamic Republic. This will help the nation not to repeat its mistake immediately after the 1979 revolution. Green Movement activists do not want to go back in history; they look forward for a brighter future.

 

Musavi explicitly calls the existing regime totalitarian, secretive and a violator of human rights. In the twelfth months after receiving Khamenei and his commanders' awakening strike, Musavi has gradually shifted toward democratic discourse. In his statement no. 18, he uses key terms of democratic literature such as popular sovereignty, rule of law, good governance, collective dialogue, rationality (as choosing between bad and worse), transparency, avoiding obligating individuals to an ideology or religion, fighting against the misuse of religion, and maintaining the independence of religious and clerical institutions from the government. In this statement, he refers to the criteria of open society such as free flow of information, strong civil society, plurality, and respect for fundamental human rights without distinction of any kind such as ideology, religion, gender, ethnicity and social status.

 

Criticizing the Existing Guardian Jurist, not the Guardian Jurist Theory

The government's repression has only made Musavi aware of the darkness and evil of the existing jurist's actions, not the autocratic foundations of the guardian jurist's rule and the constitution, and their contradictions with basic human rights. The central pillar of the Islamic Republic is discrimination against women, Sunnis, non-Muslims (Baha`is, Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians), non-Persian language speakers and non-loyalists to the government. Musavi owes his eight years of premiership to the "old man of Jamaran", (a village north of Tehran, Khomeini's residence) not the democratic process in an open and free society. Therefore, he cannot be expected to extend his criticism to Khomeini's era.

 

Musavi and other followers of Khomeini still dream of a time when they got refuge under Khomeini's mantle to enforce the constitution's articles one by one. This dream did not happen during Khomeini's leadership and the Iran-Iraq war. The dream was derailed because of political struggles between the loyalists to the regime. The twenty years old problem of Khomeini's followers was to be politically disenfranchised during Khamenei's rule, and to be looked at as "outsiders." Unfortunately the dream was not even inclusive; they did not want to extend the polity to every Iranian individual, but wanted to limit political competition among they who were in power in the 1980s.

 

Nostalgia for the Cozy Guardian Jurist

Musavi's remark about Seyyed Hasan Khomeini, Ruhollah Khomeini's grandson on June 11, 2010, is a good piece of evidence of his nostalgia to work under the mantle of a cozy guardian jurist such as his grandfather. His remarks are an indication of the religious reformists' hope to see someone from Khomeini family in the position of the guardian jurist (velayat-e faqih) in the future: “the people know Haj Seyyed Hasan as a knowledgeable, heartbroken, modest man, and a people's person. These events [not letting him to speak in the anniversary of Khomeini and heckling at him] made people to know him better. He is an intelligent man. He has his roots in the seminaries and will be a hope for our people by the side of clergy.” (Musavi and Karrubi press conference, June 11, 2010).

 

Although this is not what most of the dissidents are looking for in their fight against the regime, this plan for an experienced Iranian politician such as Musavi is more viable compared to referendum or denying the rule of the jurist, the results of which would be unclear.

 

Just as Khamenei's loyalists in the IRGC and the Intelligence Ministry will not share their power without a serious popular uprising, the religious reformists will not share their power with secular forces including Marxists, monarchists and republicans. Religious reformists believe that if they could go back to the cozy jurist and the old man of Jamaran era, there will be no need to get involved in tough political competition with a diverse set of political forces in an open society. The reformist parties, supported Musavi and Karrubi, breathe in this kind of political space; they have not shown any inclination toward the rotation of the political elite in Iran. The political parties loyal to the Islamic Republic have not expressed any desire to have dialogue with political forces who are against the Islamic Republic.

 

Some are Less Equal

When religious reformists such as Musavi and reformist political parties talk about free elections, they have never made it clear if solutions for key disagreements about the Islamic regime could be referred to the people. They have never expressed their agreement with the participation of Iranian monarchist and republican parties, and social groups such as homosexuals, Sunnis, Baha`is, and even movie actors or singers who are not insiders, in the political process. If they do not even mention these groups, how are they going to include them in the polity and enable them to participate in the political process. The rejection of qualifying process for elections simply so that it serves the interests of the religious reformists is not enough.

 

Monotheistic Collective Wisdom

The above term in Musavi's statement no. 18 puts the two Musavis right beside each other: the Green Movement Musavi who emphasizes on rationality, transparency and a government above the social classes and ideologies, and another Musavi who still thinks in the framework of monotheism and polytheism. This duality may help some people to fight against despotism due to negation of obedience to any one other than God and asking for obedience but it has three negative consequences: 1) interference of religion in the policy and decision making process in the society (which led to Islamicization of everything after the domination of monotheistic ideology); 2) decrease in the level of tolerance and exclusion of individuals who do not believe in God; and 3) giving privileges to monotheistic ideologues that leads to discrimination against people who do not believe in one God.

 

Tactic or Belief

If Musavi and other Khomeini's followers use terms such as "old man of Jamaran" or the "bright Imam's era" to use his era as a shield and reduce Khamenei's brutality and violence, delegitimize him, and to make the regime diffuse and crumble, these are rational and admirable tactics. If they believe in these terms, other dissidents are entitled to criticize the content of these beliefs. Based on Musavi and other Khomeini's followers' actions, belief in "the old man of Jamaran" is real. Even their critical approach to the 1380s (2000’s in the Gregorian calendar) is to criticize the politicians not the leader of the country. (This approach is reflected in Mostafa Tajzadeh's letter of apology to the Iranian nation).

 

Musavi has repeatedly uttered the possibility of change in the constitution of the Islamic Republic. He believes that “the statutes and constitution of the country are not eternal and non-changeable” but does not make clear that this position is a temporary campaign tactic or a permanent belief.  Musavi has never talked or written about the extent and phases of this change. People who want to enforce all articles of the constitution are aware that any change in the constitution is up to the leader's decision (article 175 of the constitution). Does Musavi's perspective on the change in the constitution include this article? If it does, then the people who are able to make the leader to declare referendum are able to make him resign too.

 

Musavi for the Green Movement activists is both an asset and a liability. He is persistent in his fight against corruption, fraud and law breaking, while he is still loyal to the fundamentals of the Islamic Republic. This makes him a good leader for the transition period. The regime is not able to arrest or kill him because is his loyal to the core of the Islamic Republic and he can control the opposition. The opposition is not able to deny him due to his role as a representative for a huge number of Muslims who are changing. Now both sides need him for different intentions and purposes.   

 

 

Subscribe to comments feed Comments (0 posted):

total: | displaying:

Post your comment

Please enter the code you see in the image:
  • Email to a friend Email to a friend
  • Print version Print version
  • Plain text Plain text
  • Permalink Permalink
Balatarin Add to your del.icio.us Facebook Donbaleh Digg this story

About author

Majid Mohammadi

Majid Mohammadi

is a visiting scholar at Stony Brook Institute for Global Studies. Before joining SBIGS in 2009, Mohammadi was an associate professor at Glenville State College, a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University and an International Policy Fellow at the Open Society Institute. Before moving to the U.S. in 2000, he worked in workshops to draft legislations. He also taught college courses on politics, media and religion, and was a consultant with a number of press centers, public institutions, and research centers in Iran. He has been granted dozens of research funds and is the author of several books, including Heaven’s... Full bio