Labor's Resistance to the Islamic Republic

International Workers’ Day had no roots in Islam; its traditions originated in the West quite a few years before the 1979 Revolution. Ayatollah Motahari, one of the most important philosophers of the Islamic Revolution and a prominent disciple of Khomeini, described communism and capitalism as “two blades of the same pair of scissors,” which were used to “destroy Islam.” In his view, this “pair of scissors” was the inevitable product of modernity and Western culture and governments. 

 

After the first years of its consolidation, the Islamic Republic – which had begun the confiscation of bankrupt factories in the private sector while nationalizing significant portions of the economy – found itself face-to-face with workers who demanded that Khomeini’s promises be put into effect. Although the Shi’a clergy and politicians had maintained close connections with thebazaaris and traditional capitalists for more than a century, they promised people that an Islamic state would eliminate poverty, destitution, and injustice. For over 100 years, the clergy had waged an endless war on both the monarchy and communists. But after the Shah’s defeat, it began to suppress the communists and socialists who were now competing with the Shi’a leadership for the political power.

 

The Islamic Revolution succeeded chiefly by relying on the support of lower social classes and populist tendencies. When the monarchists and liberals were eliminated from the political scene, the clergy turned its attention to its main rivals in the struggle for power: the leftists. Workers, lower-, and middle-class people, who also felt a cultural attachment to the clergy, embraced Khomeini’s populist policies and became the army of the 1979 Revolution.

 

During the first year of the 1979 Revolution, when political parties and organizations were still openly active and enjoyed relative freedom, the maintenance of the Revolution’s popular front and the continued support of workers and lower classes against leftist influence became the most pressing preoccupation of the regime’s leadership. The Islamic populists, who had, at that time, a reputation as the “Islamic leftists,” demonstrated, with their occupying the U.S. embassy, a stronger anti-Americanism than the communists. This incident gave the Islamic leftists the necessary leverage to nationalize the economy’s most important sections and take over the banks and private sector companies and institutions. In the first Islamic Labor Law, the dismissal of workers from their jobs for any reason was prohibited. The Islamic Workers’ Associations, the only legal professional unions in the Islamic Republic, took over the management of many factories and economic institutions as they let go multitudes of experienced managers, directors, and technocrats. The war economy, which took shape during the eight years of war with Iraq, was an additional factor that contributed to the reinforcement of a state-run economy.

 

The most important economic institutions in manufacturing and services have been either state-run or semi-state-run which have operated under government-appointed managers. The expenses of state-run factories and institutions, which often suffer considerable losses, are essentially written off, directly or indirectly, with government subsidies and oil revenues. The most significant segments of Iranian workers are employed by the government, a fact that brings them head-to-head with the clerical establishment as they demand their basic rights. The government, which has banned all independent associations of workers, has so far shown no qualms about the outright suppression of these demands. However, a state-run economy also tends to politicize the workers by turning them into adversaries.

 

In 1981, the Islamic Republic began to wipe out the leftist parties and organizations. The state-run economy, the priority of ideological considerations over economic principles in planning and managing economic institutions, the populist policies and purported “equality-seeking” demands of Islamic leftists, the institutionalized corruption and bribery, the eight-year war with Iraq, and other international tensions, all contributed to the creation of an unhealthy economy encumbered by simultaneous depression and inflation. The poor became poorer and the “nouveau riche” richer. The Islamic Republic attempted to curtail the workers’ dissatisfaction through the distribution of government subsidies. Besides supplying the factories with foreign currency at a low exchange rate to help them buy their equipment and raw materials from abroad, the Islamic Republic began the distribution of land, housing, and consumer goods among the workers at rates determined by the government. As the continuation of an emergency state during the eight-year war with Iraq had suspended all workers’ demands, the Islamic associations gradually turned into the controlling bodies that policed the behavior of workers and created an atmosphere where every protest or strike was considered sabotage, treachery, and cooperation with the enemy. Thus, Khaneye Kargar (the House of Workers,) the state-run headquarter of the Islamic Workers’ Associations across Iran, was reduced to an institution for propaganda.

 

After the war and during the eight-year presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani, some economic institutions returned to the private sector. The government still maintained its monopoly on major branches of the economy, but it also tried to strengthen the private sector and attract foreign investment. The attraction of foreign investment, except in the fields of oil and natural gas, did not yield any results. The attempt to bolster the private sector also led to the thriving of bribery and middlemen. The institutionalization of corruption and bribery, the undemocratic structure of government, and the country’s reliance on foreign trade, oil, and gas as the sole sources of public income thwarted the formation of a strong private sector. That is why areas of production and services remained quite stagnant. The only consequence of this reckless privatization, whose profits were largely reaped by powerful figures in the government, the bazaar, and the military, was the dismissal of workers from their jobs and widespread unemployment. The regime’s fling with privatization assumed disastrous dimensions because it failed to take into account the objectives and capacities of the buyers in the private sector.

 

The workers’ strikes began during Rafsanjani’s presidency as the state-controlled Islamic associations lost their influence among the workers whose dissatisfaction increased daily. The government tried to contain the strikes by both political repression and providing the workers with economic incentives. In the last years of Rafsanjani’s presidency, urban revolts were about to erupt everywhere. It was in the midst of these tribulations that religious reformists led by Khatami came to power. They announced their programs of reform and gave rise to plenty of hope, but in his two terms as president Khatami did not deviate from Rafsanjani’s economic policies. The workers, who had become disillusioned with religious reformists and state-controlled professional associations, began to organize their own independent professional groups. They also started to plan and carry out their protests in a much more systematic fashion. Unfortunately, the complex political situation did not allow these movements to bear fruit.

 

Privatization also gave rise to another trend, as factory and shop owners began to modify their labor force and sell their machinery, equipment, and facilities. Most of these owners preferred to use their capital in the profitable fields of trade and real estate. The ownership of factories allowed them to receive huge loans and avoid paying taxes. The factories, therefore, continued their production on a much smaller scale until they began to lose money, leaving them no choice but to close down. Under such circumstances, workers often received their wages after long delays. Their protests first materialized in the form of complaints and written requests, but these complaints gradually assumed the form of direct and critical challenges to the regime. The protests of workers in most cases were not, however, met with success; in the best case scenario, some workers were offered retirement packages while many others were simply dismissed.

 

Since the end of the war with Iraq, Iranian workers, like many other social groups in the country, have protested against the inefficiency of the governing system. These protests have been at times quite forceful as they have turned into demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, street violence, and confrontation. In the last few years, these protests have evolved from a series of scattered dissents into more organized and resolute forms of confrontation with the regime. These protests used to rely entirely on peaceful methods, which included meetings with the directors of factories, strikes, sit-ins, petitions, and written complaints to officials and Parliament. According to official documents, the Central Province’s Department of Labor received 18,000 complaints from workers in 2003 (the daily Kar va Kargar, 2003.) Predictably, almost all of these complaints remained unanswered.

 

The Islamic Republic has always claimed that it has waged a sweeping battle against poverty and economic inequality to establish social justice and “elevate” the lives of workers and other oppressed social classes. Alongside these recurring populist themes, independent workers’ organizations and their strikes and protests are routinely suppressed by the police and security forces. Yet even violence, threats, and prison have not been able to silence the workers. Disappointed with the government, Iranian workers are now trying to organize independent professional organizations in order to achieve their rightful demands through strikes and street demonstrations.

 

Considering that inflation keeps the workers’ families in intolerable poverty, the workers’ biggest demands naturally call for an increase of wages and job security. Their most urgent professional demands also call for the freedom of organization and the right to elect their true representatives. This is a particularly crucial demand because the regime has continually forced its hand-picked representatives to serve in the Islamic Workers’ Associations. The workers are now organizing their independent movement by demanding the right to form unions and participate in crafting labor laws. It is about time that Iran’s independent workers’ movement find its place among other democratic movements by bringing the element of “social justice” to the forefront of the struggle against a totalitarian regime.