Iranian Presidential Elections; A Test For the Effectiveness of Clergy

Apart from their results, current incidents in the country are considered a turning point in Iran’s contemporary history. Undoubtedly, the most significant reason for this prominence is the broad presence of different segments of people in this uprising against tyranny.

In the midst of all this, the empty place of clerics is completely obvious. Throughout contemporary history, the Shiite clerics have always participated in national movements against dictatorships. This participation in particular events, such as the Islamic Revolution, has assumed a vaster and more public form because a larger number of clerics from the middle ranks of religious seminaries have accompanied people in their revolt.

This time, it seems that the clerics not support people’s protest against an upstart totalitarian faction that even attacks its older conservative precursors and intends to suppress the smallest voice that seeks democracy. Of course, the statements of Grand Ayatollahs Montazeri, Sanei, and Ardabili were not unexpected if we take into account their ongoing opposition to the regime and the ill treatment they have received by the hard-liners in the past. But other religious authorities and seminary institutions have so far remained silent about the electoral coup d’état and the regime’s ruthless violence and murderous behavior toward defenseless people. What is the reason for this heavy silence? We can find the answer to this question in the current structure of the clergy and the kind of relationship and connection it has with the political regime. After the Islamic Revolution, this relationship has completely altered the two economic and political spheres by the ascription of the adjective “Islamic” to the regime; it has created a new trend that is diametrically opposed to the historical tradition of clerical institution.

The Shiite clergy, as Morteza Motaheri states, is proud that, unlike its Sunni counterpart (such as the Alazhar University in Egypt), it has not been economically dependent on any government in different historical periods. Motahari adds that the Shiite clergy has remained independent by receiving tithes and the Imam’s share from the faithful. Although this economic structure has practically prevented the seminarians from becoming a wealthy class, it has offered an independence that has encouraged the Shiite clergy to express its critical views about various regimes without fearing economic consequences.

But after the Islamic Revolution and the seizure of power by the clergy in Iran, this economic structure was transformed. In this new period, although the clergy still received financial contributions from people, it began to enjoy governmental privileges as well. Of course, some prominent figures in the seminaries, especially those who do not believe in the theoretical principles of velayat-e faqih (the rule of the jurist), assert that the seminarians and seminary teachers should maintain the tradition of independence from the government. Nonetheless, the employment of a large number of high, middle, and low ranking clerics in government-affiliated institutions, the economic difficulty that the seminarians face, and especially the policies of rulers, and in particular Ayatollah Khamenei, have made this institution decidedly dependent on the government.

The approach of Ayatollah Khamenei during his leadership exhibits major differences with the approach of Ayatollah Khomeini to the seminarians. Unlike the founder of revolution who believed the seminarians should live a simple life, Ayatollah Khamenei has tried to improve their economic condition. The assignment of free health coverage, the intermittent distribution of cheap household appliances, the distribution of free food provisions, the offering of interest-free long term loans, cash payments during religious celebrations, the assignment of aid to build Mahdavieh township and the allotment of free houses to the seminarians for a 10-year period, were some of the policies of Ayatollah Khamenei. Although we can interpret these efforts as a move to uproot the seminarians’ economic difficulties, the other side of the coin is the plan to change the traditional and historical relation between the Shiite clergy and the political system.

When Ayatollah Khamenei was chosen as the Supreme Leader, he assigned a funding to the seminarians that was equal to what the Grand Ayatollahs were paying their seminarian followers; this was simply a maneuver to elevate his prestige to the level of the Grand Ayatollahs.

The appointment of some famous seminary lecturers, who probably comprise the next generation of maraje-e taqlid (sources of emulation), to governmental positions was another tactic to buy the clergy’s support and make it dependent on the government.

Thus, a large number of clerics and seminarians became dependent on the regime in such a way that no signs of what Morteza Motaheri had called the criticism of government could survive.

Besides changing the clergy’s economic structure, the Islamic Revolution also transformed the political structure of this institution. Before the genesis of “the theory of velayat-e faqih,” the dominant paradigm in the thought of Shiite clergy was based on this premise: to rule is the right of the innocent Imam and no one but he has the permission to form a government. On this basis, all individuals who endeavor to establish a government during the presence of the Innocent Imam are the usurpers of the Imam’s right. The governments that are created in the absence of the Imam are also temporary states that have resulted either from an emergency situation or are necessary for the survival of a society that would otherwise collapse. What these two kinds of governments have in common is the fact that the sharia prohibits the clergy’s relations and cooperation with them both, especially if this cooperation leads to the consolidation of their foundation.

But with the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the clergy’s ascent to power, the paradigm of usurping the government was challenged by the competing paradigm of velayat-e faqih. Although this new paradigm was young and lacked favor among the old religious figures in the seminaries, it relied on power. The government’s relentless propaganda to justify this theory, its direct and indirect pressure on the clerics who opposed it, and the war and critical conditions of the country in certain periods, which justified the necessity of pretense to unity, all had a part in creating this new paradigm. In addition, the government’s attempt to make the seminarians and seminary teachers—especially the young clerics who form the seminaries’ body—indebted to the regime by providing them with economic and political rents, reinforced this paradigm day by day. Finally, the creation of “the Management Council of Elmiye Seminary” for managing the clerics’ affairs —which was previously controlled by maraje-e taqlid—and the appointment of this council’s head by the Supreme Leader’s direct order was a move that institutionalized the transformation of the clergy’s political structure and effaced its autonomy completely. This transformation was so profound that the task of approving the seminarians’ qualification for ejtehad (jurisprudence) was taken away from maraje-e taqlid and was given to “the Guardian Council” (seemingly, as a measure for the seminarians’ future participation in “the Assembly of Experts”).

The establishment of “the Special Court for Clerics” in the judiciary and “the Special Bureau for Clerics” in the Intelligence Ministry were the complementary links that intended to ensure the clerics’ political dependence on the regime and guarantee their forced submission to its policies. What these centers did to Ayatollahs Montazeri, Shirazi, and other dissenting and imprisoned maraje-e taqlid, were clear messages that aimed at intimidating the clerics by the unfortunate consequences of opposition to the regime’s policies and moving outside the bogus dominant structure.

The four-year term of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that has led to the current crisis in the country was a good test to assess the efficiency of this dependent structural system. The last four years have shown that the majority of clerics and maraje-e taqlid do not consider Ahmadinejad an ideal president and, in comparison with other presidents, have established the least relations with him. They have even criticized his policies directly or implicitly in these four years. But at this point, and after Ahmadinejad’s vote-rigging, the Supreme Leader’ prejudiced defense of this electoral coup d’état has tied the fate of the Islamic Republic to the fate of Ahmadinejad. For this reason, the clerics and religious authorities have considered opposition to Ahmadinejad’s disreputable policies during the election campaigns and after it as an affront to the theocratic regime. They refuse to criticize Ahmadinejad because they either dread its consequences or fear to lose their privileges or really believe in the supremacy of theocratic rule over other political systems.

In fact, we should emphasize that the silence of clerics regarding the country’s recent incidents and their submission to the Supreme Leader’s despotic decision have shown that this dependent structural system, despite its novelty when compared to the centuries old history of the seminaries, has functioned efficiently and according to the objectives of its architects.