Editorial: The Shape of Reform

Must Iran change? Do the Iranian people desire reform? If so, how far should this reform go? How can political, social, economic, and cultural change occur in Iran? Who could be the agents of this change – a charismatic leader, civil society groups, or the Iranian citizens? We begin with these questions, which are echoed throughout Iranian society, because every movement for change begins with such questions and, as it grows, these questions multiply. 

Such questions demonstrate to authoritarian leaders that the answers that they have forcibly delivered are insufficient. Discussion, dialogue, and compromise among diverse perspectives occur over time – too long for leaders after fast results. These fast “results” come in the form of cheap, populist slogans instead of thoughtful analysis, gossip and fear-mongering instead of news, and the creation of divisions and mistrust instead of exchange and compromise. Political Sociologist Mehrdad Mashayekhi dissects this polarization and mistrust among Islamic reformists and secular forces and proposes a plan of action to overcome their differences and challenge hardliners in government.

The collective calls to action in recent history, which arose from the people’s need for social justice, wreaked havoc on Iran’s political, social, and economic infrastructures. Farzin Vahdat argues that, through the 1979 Revolution, Iranians developed a taste for "agency," (the capacity for individuals to make and impose their choices), laying the foundation for modern democracy. Armed with this desire for agency and the rights and freedoms that accompany it and disillusioned by quick fixes, the Iranian people sought something beyond revolution.

It was this yearning that led millions to the polls to support President Khatami and his pro-reform movement which aimed to institute slow, incremental changes from within the system. In an interview, Yousef Molaee, attorney to Mansour Ossanlou and other activists who have landed in the Islamic Republic’s courts, explains why an inability to navigate the structural realities of the three branches of government led the inexperienced reformists to failure, creating deep disenchantment, anger, and apathy among many Iranians, particularly women and youth.

With Iranians inside and outside the regime system from across the political spectrum disappointed with the Ahmadinejad presidency, the upcoming parliamentary elections (despite their deeply flawed process) provide a practical framework through which to consider the questions above. Iranians remain divided on the way forward. Mohsen Sazegara sees little room for reform without an overhaul of the current political structure codified in the Constitution and pronounces the reform movement dead. On the other hand, former Member of Parliament Fatemeh Haghighatjoo argues that while top-down reform is dead, bottom-up change through civil society actors is very much alive. She suggests that these actors unite for peace against the threats that Ahmadinejad’s failed foreign policy has bestowed on Iran. 

Remarkably, Iranians and civil society have continued to use the meager mechanisms available to them to consider actionable solutions to the questions above. These mechanisms (while each hobbled or rigged in its own way) include elections, public discourse through the internet, and projects to engage the Iranian people, such as the Campaign for One Million Signatures and the student movement. Ethnic and religious minorities, secular forces, intellectual dissidents, and other marginalized groups have been absent from the debate altogether. The disappointment experienced by all Iranians – these marginalized groups, civil society, and the agents for change, including the Islamic reformists – must develop into a new kind of hope and a confidence in their own power and in the need for collaboration and mutual support of other forces seeking the answers to the same questions.